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PLURALISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CAUSATION:
DESIDERATUM OR NOT?1
Leen De Vreese
1. Introduction 
For a long time, philosophers working on the topic of causation have
been looking for one univocal approach. “Causation” is nonetheless a
concept widely used in a variety of reasoning processes. The difficulties
experienced in searching for a unique approach able to deal with this
diversity have changed the way philosophers think about causation. In
the last couple of years, one can notice a shift in attention from the
defences and elaborations of opposing univocal approaches towards the
development of approaches that leave more room for diversity. As an
effect, the topic of causal pluralism has enormously gained interest in the
debates on philosophy of causation. This does not mean that pluralistic
ideas are generally accepted. Currently, one can discern two camps. On
the one hand, some philosophers still swear by causal monism and
continue working in this tradition. On the other hand, a different group of
philosophers considers a pluralistic view on the matter as a solution to
the problems encountered in monistic causal approaches. However, since
the debate on causal pluralism is scarcely out of the egg, it is
unstructured and confusing, even on what “causal pluralism” itself
means.
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Is it worth the effort to keep searching for a singular approach? Or
can a pluralistic view offer us a more accurate picture of causation and
our notion of it? And if so, how to develop a pluralistic theory on
“causation”? All these questions lie at the basis of this volume of
Philosophica. 
In the following section, I highlight some reasons to become a
causal pluralist. I will refer to James Woodward’s Making things happen
(Woodward, 2003) to point to some problems causal monists have to deal
with and causal pluralists may be able to solve. I further distinguish
between different ways to be a causal pluralist: one can approach causal
pluralism from a conceptual, metaphysical or epistemological-
methodological point of view. In section 4 of this introduction, I list the
questions the contributors to this volume were asked to focus on in their
papers. A short overview of the content of the contributions is given in
the final section. 
2. Reasons for and ways of being a causal pluralist 
James Woodward recently made an important contribution to the
philosophy of causation with the development of his interventionist
theory of causation published in (Woodward, 2003). Woodward gives a
univocal conceptual analysis of our notion of “cause” and is, from the
beginning of his book, very explicit about his anti-pluralistic stance in
this project. In the acknowledgements he consciously remarks: 
Writers in the grip of a single, overarching set of ideas sometimes
tend to suppose that these ideas can be used to resolve all of the
extant problems in their subject area. I fear that I have not been
immune to this impulse. (Woodward, 2003:vi) 
The concept “cause” as defined in his interventionist theory is intended
to be applicable to causal reasoning in as much disciplines as possible.
Woodward clearly experiences the limited applicability of a causal
theory as a problem. Only one single concept of causation covering
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2 Woodward nonetheless recognizes that one can discern different kinds of
causes, e.g. total causes, direct causes, contributing causes, etc. However, these
different kinds of causes should all be captured by means of his single notion in
terms of interventionist counterfactuals.
causal reasoning in all domains of science is acceptable.2 Clearly,
Woodward does not consider thinking in terms of distinct concepts of
causation. He presents us a candidate for the one and only theory of
causation and causal explanation in which the problems of alternative
theories are said to be discarded. He describes the alternative theories as
rival and competitive, and proclaims his own theory as “the most
promising” over the whole line. 
Indeed, Woodward managed wonderfully well to develop a theory
applicable to a whole range of cases. However, one can wonder whether
this generality is an advantage. As Woodward claims himself with regard
to the general concept of explanation: “generality is not always a virtue”
(Woodward, 2003:5). The question is whether the same problem does not
also occur in the specific case of causation and causal explanation.
Woodward’s unifying aim leads indeed to some tensions in his approach.
On the one hand, he claims that patterns of counterfactual dependence as
revealed by his interventionist approach are the “objective core” behind
causal judgments, but on the other hand, he is forced to accept the
influence of interests and what causal reasoners interpret as “serious
possibilities” as contributory in causal reasoning. By explaining causality
and “resolving all extant problems” such as causal overdetermination,
omission, prevention, etc. along the interventionist lines he seems to
redefine the concept “cause” such that it fits the theory rather than the
reverse. Consequently, although Woodward claims to lean on causal
intuitions and rejects alternative approaches on the basis of their
incongruity with these intuitions, some elements intuitively perceived as
causes are claimed to be wrongly entitled as “causes” on the basis of his
own theory, while other elements intuitively not perceived as such are
presented as “real causes” by Woodward. To give just one example as it
was criticized by Glymour:
A woman’s sex or race cannot, according to Woodward’s
constraint, be a cause of her treatment by someone else, since there
are no interventions on either feature with suitable invariance.
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3 Christopher Hitchcock presented in his article Of Humean Bondage (Hitchcock,
2003) a whole range of examples on which our causal intuitions can disagree.
Woodward argues that sex fragments into many different variables,
ranging from genotype to employer beliefs about a person’s sex.
Claims about sex as a cause, he argues, are  typically ambiguous.
Granted, but philosophers are skilled at disambiguating when they
want to and I think the point remains that genotype is not, on his
view, even a remote cause of an individual’s treatment by others.
These last cases are in my view regrettable consequences of trying
to found a theory of causal explanations on interventions.
(Glymour, 2004:789-790)
The question is then whether Woodward has the right to use these subtle
manoeuvres for the benefit of uniformity? Since we can’t avoid being
confronted with contradictory causal intuitions3, every monistic causal
approach will need to revise our notion of “cause” such that
inconsistencies in our intuitions are decided. Hence, a big challenge for a
conceptual causal monist is to find an objective and convincing criterion
to justify that one should revise one’s causal intuitions precisely in the
way suggested by the approach defended. In fact, Woodward does not
seem to have such a criterion, except for the strong belief in his own
theory, to justify his revisions. Such arbitrary revisionism might be
overcome by a pluralistic approach, in which contradictory intuitions
might be explained by different, but equally acceptable, approaches to
causation.
A second aspect of causal reasoning that causal monists do not
take into account, is that the context of the reasoning process and/or the
context in which the causal event itself arose, can influence our causal
judgments. Even if one is convinced that “causation” can be captured by
a single concept, what will be selected as “the cause” may vary
dependent on these contextual factors. On the other hand, contextual
factors may also take part in deciding which approach to causation is
appropriate in the situation under consideration, and may hence further
justify a non-univocal approach to causation. A second challenge for the
causal monist is thus to avoid that his general approach, which is denying
contextual elements of possible importance for causal decisions, becomes
too uninformative to characterize everyday causal reasoning.
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However, one can also argue for or against causal pluralism from a
totally different point of view, namely from metaphysical convictions.
Phil Dowe, for example, clearly defends metaphysical causal monism
(Dowe 1992, Dowe 1995, Dowe 2000). He is convinced that, from a
metaphysical point of view, causation is a univocal relation describable
in terms of conserved quantities at the physical level. Dowe nonetheless
admits that we use other concepts of causation, incorporating for
example prevention and omission. He labels the latter kinds of “causes”
“quasi-causation” and admits that it is not necessary for practical
purposes to distinguish “quasi-causation” from real causation (Dowe,
2004). 
Woodward does not offer metaphysical reasons to underpin his
monistic conceptual approach. What he does use to underpin his
conceptual approach are arguments from a scientific point of view.
Witness, for example, Woodward’s reaction to Skyrms’ pluralistic ideas
(see Woodward, 2003:91-93) that all of the criteria for causation have
more or less equal weight and that we hence have to think of causation as
a cluster concept involving all these approaches: 
whatever the appeal of the cluster concept account as a description
of the concept of causation with which we ordinarily operate, it is a
problematic account from the point of view of methodology - it is
not a concept we should adopt. On the one hand, if we formulate
the cluster theory in such a way that satisfaction of all of the above
criteria is necessary for the application of the concept “causation,”
we will exclude a large number of scientifically interesting cases of
causation. On the other hand, if we say that “most” or “many” of
the criteria must be satisfied or that some criteria are more
“important” than other or  that “different criteria will be weighted
differently in different contexts,” then unless we can explain with
some precision what the quoted  phrases mean, we will end up with
a concept of causation that is vague and unclear, and the
application of which to specific cases is uncertain and contestable.
[...] One of many virtues of a monocriterial view like the
manipulability theory is that it forces investigators to be less vague
and noncommittal about what they mean when they use this word
[“cause”]. (Woodward, 2003:93)
First of all, I think Woodward (just like a lot of other participants in the
causal pluralism debate) fails to make a distinction between arguments
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underpinning conceptual causal pluralism and arguments underpinning
epistemological-methodological causal pluralism. Further, if we read
these arguments of Woodward as supporting epistemological-
methodological causal monism (along with conceptual causal monism),
they can still be questioned. Will all investigators in all domains of
science indeed be able to be clearer when they are forced to use a single
limited concept of causation? And is it on the other hand really
unimaginable to develop some precision with regard to the view that
“different criteria will be weighted differently in different [scientific]
contexts”? Monistic oriented philosophers of science will probably be
easily convinced, but it might not be so for pluralistic oriented ones. 
The ultimate question regarding Woodward’s recent contribution
to the philosophy of causation is then: is the generality with regard to the
concept “cause” as purchased by Woodward a real virtue and the right
approach to the subject? The contributors to this volume were presented
with this and related questions, which will be listed in the following
section.
3. The topics of this volume of Philosophica 
In the previous sections of this introduction, some questions regarding
causal pluralism have already arisen. The following questions served as a
guideline for the contributors. 
First of all, some questions related to the very general question
whether causal pluralism is something we should avoid or rather endorse:
P Is it possible and/or necessary to find one singular and overall concept
of causation? 
P Do some counterexamples form a thorough reason to entirely reject a
theory of causation? 
P Is generality a virtue with regard to the characterization of causation? 
P Is it necessary and/or possible to develop a pluralistic view on
causation? 
P Will a pluralistic view offer us a more accurate picture of the causal
reality? 
Secondly, some questions related to the elaboration of such a
pluralistic approach to causation: 
P How to develop this pluralistic characterization? 
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P What kinds of pluralism should one embrace with regard to causation?
Conceptual pluralism? Ontological pluralism? Epistemological
pluralism? Methodological pluralism? 
P What is the importance of the intuitive conceptions of causation?
Should a theory of causation try to get grip on their diversity or should it
rather redefine the concept to maintain one general criterion? And how to
do this? 
Lastly, what are the consequences of choosing for a pluralistic
approach? 
P Will a pluralistic approach to causation necessarily end in a vague and
unclear conception which is difficult to apply in practice? 
P What will be the concrete consequences for future research when
adopting a pluralistic approach? 
4. The answers of the contributors
The previous sections already made clear that the dispute on “causal
pluralism” is not at all battled out. On the one hand, the idea of “causal
pluralism” is not generally accepted and on the other hand, the notion
itself can be understood and filled in in many diverse ways. This is also
clear from the contributions in the volume at hand. A uniform idea on
what “causal pluralism” means, and on whether it should in some way or
other be accepted as a fruitful approach at all, certainly does not arise
from the aggregate of these contributions. The most important thing these
contributions illustrate might precisely be this diversity of ideas on
“causal pluralism”. 
Raffaella Campaner and Francis Longworth both approach causal
pluralism from a conceptual point of view. In Mechanisms and
Counterfactuals: A different glimpse of the (secret?) connexion,
Campaner holds a plea for using two concepts of cause at the same time
when performing a conceptual analysis, namely a combination of a
counterfactual and a mechanical approach. She argues that these
approaches complement each other and are of equal value and
importance. While the mechanical approach has an important
explanatory role to play, counterfactuals are important for their heuristic
capacities. 
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Francis Longworth, in Causation, Pluralism and Responsibility
begins from Ned Hall's position (2004) that “causation” has to be
interpreted as a disjunctive concept in which, contrary to the conceptual
pluralism of Campaner, either of the disjuncts (i.e., production or
dependence) is sufficient for “causation”. Longworth presents some
counterexamples to Hall's approach, and then explores whether the
introduction of the notion of “responsibility” offers a means of evading
these counterexamples.
Jon Williamson argues against causal pluralism in Causal
Pluralism versus Epistemic Causality. His arguments are mainly based
on metaphysical convictions. He maintains that causation is not
physically real, but has to be analysed in terms of rational beliefs. Our
rational causal beliefs yield one, singular concept of cause, making both
metaphysical and conceptual causal pluralism false. However, this
singular concept of cause is multifaceted in the sense that there are
several different indicators of causal relations. Consequently, Williamson
does accept a certain kind of epistemological causal pluralism.
The last two contributions of the volume approach causal
pluralism from a scientific point of view. Federica Russo focuses on the
social sciences in The Rationale of Variation in Methodological and
Evidential Pluralism and defends a monistic epistemological account.
She argues that, despite methodological and evidential pluralism in the
social sciences, one is confronted with a monistic epistemology which is
based on the rationale of variation. She further argues that her approach
helps in liberating the social sciences from the hallmark of being inferior
to the natural sciences. 
Lastly, in my own contribution entitled Causal Pluralism and
Scientific Knowledge: an Underexposed Problem, I argue more generally
that an epistemological-methodological approach to causal pluralism
should be valued as a line of approach on its own. I further defend
epistemological-methodological causal pluralism by demonstrating and
arguing that we need different causal concepts to gain scientific
knowledge. On the one hand, we need different causal concepts for
different scientific domains, and on the other hand, we might even need
different causal concepts within singular scientific domains. 
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5. Conclusion  
Although the contributions in this volume will not at all settle the dispute
on “causal pluralism”, we hope they will help us one step further in the
development of arguments pro and contra causal pluralism, and in
clarifying what causal pluralism could signify for the philosophy of
causation.
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